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The Group of Wise Persons (hereafter GWP)  appointed by the Committee of 
Ministers, in 2005, to examine ways of securing the long-term effectiveness of the 
European Court of Human Rights (hereafter the Court) produced their final report at 
the end of  2006. The report
1
 identified two  major functions undertaken by the Court: 
23 The right of individual application enshrined in Articles 34 and 35 of the 
Convention is the most distinctive feature of this control mechanism.  The Court 
is the only international court to which any individual, non-governmental 
organisation or group of individuals have access for the purpose of enforcing 
their rights under the Convention. The right of individual application is today 
both an essential part of the system and a basic feature of European legal culture 
in this field. 
24 This protection mechanism confers on the Court at one and the same time a 
role of individual supervision and a “constitutional” mission. The former 
consists in verifying the conformity with the Convention of any interference by 
a state with individual rights and freedoms and making findings as to any 
violation by the respondent state. Its other function leads it to lay down common 
principles and standards relating to human rights and to determine the minimum 
level of protection which states must observe. 
 
What I intend to do in this paper is to offer some thoughts, based upon my research, 
on  how the Court has, is and may in the future perform the latter role. 
 
The Past 
Under the original tripartite Strasbourg control system the part-time Court primarily 
focused upon the constitutional mission role and its jurisprudence (in leading 
judgments such as Lawless v Ireland (no3)
2
 regarding derogations in times of 
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emergency and Dudgeon v UK
3
 concerning the criminalisation of  homosexual 
relations) provided the foundations for the Court’s contemporary adjudication. A 
significant achievement of the original Court was its development of  a body of  case 
law elaborating the obligations upon member states to establish and maintain 
democratic political systems.
4
 From a range of  Convention Articles, including Article 
3 of Protocol 1 (right to free elections), Article 11 (freedom of assembly and 
association) and Article 10 (freedom of expression), the Court refined the elements of  
an effective political democracy. These included, inter alia, the importance of  
pluralism in the political dialogue within member states and the crucial role of  
diverse political parties in  promoting non-violent challenges to the governing party.
5
  
The ability of  persons to vote and stand for elected office.
6
  Together with the role of 
pressure groups in seeking to inform the public of their  opinions.
7
 These important 
judgments represent classic examples of the original Court performing its 
constitutional mission in a jurisdiction formerly the preserve of national supreme 
courts. 
 
The Present 
Under the Protocol 11 control system it is the Court’s seventeen member Grand 
Chamber that has the major responsibility for performing the constitutional mission.
8
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There are two ways in which cases raising such issues can be determined by the 
Grand Chamber. First, where a Chamber considers that it should relinquish 
jurisdiction over the case to the Grand Chamber because the litigation, “raises a 
serious question affecting the interpretation of the Convention or the Protocols 
thereto, or where the resolution of a question before the Chamber might have a result 
inconsistent  with a judgment previously delivered by the Court”.9 Either party to the 
case may prohibit relinquishment. Chambers have been cautious in relinquishing 
cases with about five per year being sent to the Grand Chamber. However, these have 
raised questions of the utmost importance involving, inter alia, the overlapping 
obligations of   many member states under the Convention and EU law and more 
broadly the relationship between the Strasbourg and  Luxembourg courts
10
.  This was 
clearly a monumental  constitutional decision affecting the interaction of these two 
legal systems. Relinquishment cases have also encompassed highly sensitive disputes 
arising from the collapse of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, such as 
Slivenko v Latvia
11
, where the underlying problem was the tensions between the 
Latvian majority  and minority Russian populations. Furthermore, the relinquishment 
process has enable the Grand Chamber to undertake the constitutional function of  a 
legal system’s highest court to update jurisprudence in accordance with evolving 
social trends. Hence in Christine Goodwin v UK
12
, a unanimous Grand Chamber 
departed from the approach of the original Court and held that contemporary 
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standards required member states to provide legal recognition of the new identities of  
post-operative transsexuals. 
 The second method by which the Grand Chamber can become seized of  cases 
which raise, “a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the 
Convention or the protocols thereto, or a serious issue of  general importance”13 is via 
the more controversial process of  referral, by a party to the dispute, after a Chamber 
has given judgment on the merits. Both the original Court and the European 
Commission of Human Rights criticised the idea of a single court pronouncing 
judgment twice on the same case.
14
 But, states insisted that a referral mechanism be 
incorporated into the Protocol 11 reforms. Individual applicants have applied for 
referrals in more cases than states: 260 requests by individual applicants compared to 
192 by states, between 2002-2005. The screening panels (of  five judges including the 
President of the Court) have adopted a strict attitude towards the above eligibility 
criteria. Individual applicants have been successful in four and a half percent of their 
applications and states have achieved the higher success rate of  seventeen percent. 
When a case is referred to the Grand Chamber the latter re-hears all aspects of the 
case, not just specific elements of the Chamber’s judgment.15  This can even extend to 
the Grand Chamber re-determining the (in)admissibility of the case.
16
 Therefore, the 
reality of the process is that the Grand Chamber is acting as an appellate court in 
respect of Chamber. A vivid example of  this can be seen in Hatton v UK
17
, where the 
Grand Chamber held that the Chamber majority had failed to follow the established 
                                                 
13
 ECHR, Article 43(2). 
 
14
 See, A. Mowbray, “A new European Court of Human Rights”, [1994] Public Law 540. 
 
15
 K and T v Finland (2003) 36 EHRR 18. 
 
16
 Azinas v Cyprus (2005) 40 EHRR 8. 
 
17
 Judgment of 8 July 2003. 
 
 5 
approach to evaluating environmental pollution claims under Article 8 and had 
instead adopted an impermissible stance which accorded special status to 
environmental rights. 
 A concern I have about the institutional arrangements governing referrals is 
the presence of  the Chamber President and respondent state national judge on the 
Grand Chamber which re-hears the case.
18
  The Rules of Court ensure that judges 
sitting in  Chambers
19
 and as members of  screening panels
20
 have not had any prior 
involvement with the cases they are determining. As we have seen the re-hearing of  
cases under Article 43 is an appellate activity. Therefore, I believe that the 
membership of the Grand Chamber should be entirely free from any prior 
involvement in the litigation. The presence of the relevant national judge on the 
Chamber will have ensured that any special insights he/she may have will have been 
reflected in the judgment of the Chamber (or any separate opinion he/she may have 
delivered
21
). Furthermore, the removal of these two judges from the  Grand Chamber 
will avoid them being placed in the embarrassing position of having to reconsider 
their own judgment in the Chamber. As Judge Costa, now President of the Court, 
observed in regard to the dilemma these two judges face: 
Must they adhere strictly to their initial opinion (which moreover is now only of 
historical value, since the Chamber’s judgment, as res judicata, is invalidated 
with retrospective effect)? Or must they, with the benefit of hindsight, depart 
from or even overturn their previous opinion? Here again, everything depends 
on the specific features of the case…and on each judge’s greater or lesser degree 
of stubbornness (or ability to reconsider his or her previous conclusions)…22 
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The Future 
As is well known the major challenge to the Court over recent years has been the 
growing numbers of individual applications and associated backlog of cases. Protocol  
14 seeks to make the Court more efficient through measures such as the creation of  
single-judge formations.
23
 But the final report of the GWP contained the ominous 
prediction that: 
32. It will not be possible to make a final assessment of the effects of the entry 
into force of Protocol No. 14 until it has been in operation for some time. 
However, it can already be anticipated that the reforms it introduces will not be 
sufficient to enable the Court to find any long lasting solution to the problem of 
congestion. According to estimates produced within the Court, the increase in 
productivity resulting from the implementation of this Protocol might be 
between 20 and 25%.
24
 
 
The major institutional reform advocated by  the final report was the creation of a 
“Judicial Committee”, a separate judicial filtering body, to undertake the functions of  
determining the admissibility of applications and the merits of manifestly well-
founded applications (which do not raise novel questions of law).
25
 The GWP 
believed that the establishing of such a body would facilitate the determination of  
individual applications by a judicial decision whilst enabling the Court to “focus on 
its essential role”26  (presumably its constitutional mission). The final report proposed 
that the members of the Judicial Committee “would be judges enjoying full 
guarantees of independence.”27 But, implicitly, the GWP considered them to be of 
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lower status than Judges of the Court as the final report suggested that the 
qualifications for being appointed to the Judicial Committee should include having 
“high moral character and possess[ing] the qualifications required for appointment to 
judicial office.”28 Whereas, nominees to the Court are required to have “the 
qualifications required for appointment to high judicial office”29 (my emphasis). The 
Court would also have a formal role in assessing the professional qualifications and 
linguistic knowledge of candidates nominated for the appointment to the Judicial 
Committee.
30
 The final report recommended that the number of members of the 
Judicial Committee should be less than the number of states party to the ECHR. The 
Committee of Ministers would decide on the size of the Judicial Committee and the 
number could be varied by the Committee of Ministers acting on a proposal from the 
Court. Nominations from states of members of the Judicial Committee would 
alternate via rotation, but the Judicial Committee would reflect “a geographical 
balance as well as a harmonious gender balance”.31 The Judicial Committee would be 
a subordinate body to the Court and come under the latter’s “authority”. 
Consequently, the Chair of the Judicial Committee would be a member of the Court, 
appointed by the latter for a specified period.
32
 Also, the Court would have a “special 
power”, of its own motion, to review any decision adopted by the Judicial 
Committee.
33
 Additionally, the Judicial Committee could refer a case to the Court if it 
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considered that the case merited determination by that body.
34
 But, in order to prevent 
the Court being overburdened, no appeals should be allowed against the decisions of 
the Judicial Committee.
35
 
 Given that the Judicial Committee would take over the merits decision-making 
function of  Committees of three judges, to be exercised under Protocol 14, together 
with the admissibility responsibilities of single-judge formations, the role of being a 
member of the Judicial Committee could be more interesting than solely determining 
the question of admissibility. By removing these categories of decisions from the 
Court there should be a great freeing up of judicial resources for use in complex 
admissible cases addressing the Court’s constitutional mission. 
 The final report considered that it was “necessary” to change the system of 
determining the amounts of just satisfaction to be paid to successful applicants under 
Article 41 of the ECHR. Both the Court and the Judicial Committee ought to be 
relieved of the burden of  assessing how much compensation should be paid. 
…[I]t is proposed that the general rule should be that the decision on the amount 
of compensation is referred to the state concerned. However, the Court and the 
Judicial Committee would have the power to depart from this rule and give their 
own decision on just satisfaction where such a decision is found to be necessary 
to ensure effective protection of the victim, especially where it is a matter of 
particular urgency.
36
 
 
Member states would be under a duty to inform the Committee of   Ministers which 
national judicial body had been designated to perform this task. Undue formalities and 
unreasonable costs/fees must not be imposed by the relevant national judicial bodies. 
These bodies would be obliged to follow the Court’s jurisprudence governing just 
satisfaction and  victims would be able to apply to the Court or Judicial Committee 
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where the national judicial authority failed to comply with the Court’s case-law or 
deadlines set for resolving the calculation of compensation. Given the frequently 
widely differing views of successful applicants and respondent States as to the 
appropriate amount of compensation due, for example in the Case of the Former King 
of Greece and Others v Greece
37
 the applicants claimed 472 million euros in respect 
of pecuniary damage whilst the Government contended that the applicants’ ancestors 
had benefited from fiscal and other privileges worth 579 million euros, allied to the 
far from coherent jurisprudence of the Court
38
 it seems highly likely that many 
national just satisfaction determinations would be challenged at Strasbourg unless the 
Court and Judicial Committee were to adopt a restrictive approach to such petitions. 
The GWP’s  recommendation of devolution of responsibility for calculating just 
satisfaction awards will be welcomed by the  Court as it  has already made clear its 
view that this function is not a high priority. In Salah v The Netherlands
39
, a 
unanimous Chamber held that: 
…the awarding of sums of money to applicants by way of just satisfaction is not 
one of the Court’s main duties but is incidental to its task of ensuring the 
observance by States of their obligations under the Convention.
40
  
 
 Intriguingly the GWP had canvassed the idea, in its interim report
41
 of  
enabling the Court to give “judgments of principle” that would be binding upon all 
member states. Where a case involved an issue of principle that affected more than 
the respondent state all member states would be invited to participate in the 
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proceedings. According to the interim report enabling the Court to deliver such 
judgments would enhance its constitutional role and also reduce the need for separate 
judgments in cases involving different states. However, by the time of the final report 
the GWP had rejected the notion: 
68 After discussing the matter in greater depth, the Group believes that it would 
be difficult to arrive at a precise definition of this category of judgments. 
Furthermore, it is not always possible to identify in advance all the cases that 
might give rise to judgments of principle. 
69 The Group therefore does not make any proposal as to a specific procedure 
for dealing with such cases. It merely recommends that judgments of principle- 
like all judgments which the Court considers particularly important- be more 
widely disseminated.
42
 
 
The final report did support the idea of the Court being empowered to provide 
advisory opinions on the interpretation of the ECHR to national supreme courts  as, 
“[t]his is an innovation which would foster dialogue between courts and enhance the 
Court’s “constitutional” role.”43 National courts would have the option to request an 
advisory opinion. Interestingly, the final report proposed that, “…to enhance the 
judicial authority of this type of advisory opinion, all the State Parties to the 
Convention should have the opportunity to submit observations to the Court on the 
legal issues on which an opinion is requested.”44 The ability of all member states to 
participate in this new form of  proceedings echoes the interim report’s advocacy of a 
similar involvement of all States in “judgments of principle”. The GWP considered 
that, “…providing such opinions would not be the Court’s principal judicial 
function.”45  Also, to prevent requests for advisory opinions from creating a new wave 
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of proceedings to further overwhelm the Court they should be subject to stringent 
limitations: 
(a) only constitutional courts or courts of last instance should be able to submit 
a request for an opinion; 
(b) the opinions requested should only concern questions of principle or of 
general interest relating to the interpretation of the Convention or the 
protocols thereto; 
(c) the Court should have a discretion to refuse to answer a request for an 
opinion. For example, the Court might consider that it should not give an 
answer in view of the state of its case-law or because the subject-matter of 
the request overlaps with that of a pending case. It would not have to give 
reasons for its refusal.
46
 
 
Professor Greer  has expressed strong criticism of the idea of conferring such a 
jurisdiction on the Court. He believes that, “…since advisory opinions can only be 
expressed in vague and general terms, they are unlikely to add anything of substance 
to the future of the Convention system.”47 I am also cautious in that the Court has no 
significant heritage of expertise regarding this type of proceedings.
48
 
 The unresolved question is the extent of the willingness of all member states 
to support major institutional reform of the Strasbourg control system in order to 
enable the Court to have sufficient resources to perform its constitutional mission 
without being drowned by the torrent of  individual applications. 
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